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I. INTRODUCTION
An ode to the discerning citizen. The picture painted by the
majority is glorious: a country where each citizen is able to weigh
and evaluate every piece of information thrown in their direction
during the modern world's twenty-four hour news cycle, and the
people take their rightful place as the arbiters of corporate greed in
the political arena.
In this vision, every citizen is armed with the ability and the
means of discerning the identity of every organization that is
spending money on every ad they see on television and determining
whether those ads are accurate. Most importantly, each citizen is
able to figure out if the politician, whose campaign is collaterally
helped by those ads, is voting on legislation in support of or giving
access to the corporations who wrote the checks for the ad.
While impressed with the faith the majority has in the ability
of the people to police candidates and moneyed corporate interests
and to perceive when a politician's influence is bought and paid for,
the opacity of the campaign finance process, the limited nature of
current disclosure requirements, and the limited time individual
citizens have to investigate the reels of information presented to them
during the short period leading up to important elections, paint a less
glorious picture of confusion, disorientation, and the potential for
deceit.
II. BACKGROUND TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
A. Legislative History
The first federal attempt at campaign financing reform was the
Tillman Act of 1907 ("Tillman Act").' After years of complaints by
Democrats and Republicans alike that corporate moneyed interests
influenced federal, particularly presidential, elections, President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 called for a prohibition on corporate
campaign contributions:
' Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907) (current
version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
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All contributions by corporations to any political
committee or for any political purpose should be
forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to
use stockholders' money for such purposes; and,
moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it
went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at
in corrupt practices acts.2
The result of this push was the Tillman Act, which prohibited
direct contributions by corporations to candidates for federal office. 3
Congress expanded this prohibition to unions in 1943 with the War
Labor Disputes Act.4 To this day, the federal government, and most
states, limit or prohibit corporate and union direct expenditures to
candidate campaigns.5 However, the Tillman Act left independent
corporate expenditures unregulated.6 This gap in regulation allowed
corporations to continue to spend money in ways that directly
benefited individual candidates without implicating the federal rules
against expenditures.
2 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010)
(quoting 40 Cong. Rec. 96, 96 (1906)).
3 Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. at 864-65. The Tillman Act only covered
contributions to presidential, vice-presidential, Senate, House, and Electoral
College elections. Id.
4 War Labor Disputes Act, 78 Pub. L. No. 89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) (repealed
1945).
5 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
6 See Tillman Act, 34 Stat. at 864-65. There are three primary mechanisms
through which organizations and individuals spend money to influence elections:
(1) campaign contributions: either writing a check directly to the candidate, or
following directions by the candidate on how to spend the money, (2) contributions
to an aligned third party: giving money to a third party organization, such as a
Political Action Committee, which is ideologically or directly involved with the
candidate's campaign, (3) independent expenditures: spending money on activities
that support or oppose a candidate's election without any previous agreement or
direction from the candidate. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking
Dam?. Corporate Money and Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 91, 95-97 (2009).
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and
Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 91, 95-97 (2009), for a more detailed analysis of
these three means of spending money on campaigns.
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Not until the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Taft-
Hartley Act") 7 did Congress first address the topic of independent
expenditures. The Taft-Hartley Act prohibited independent
expenditures by corporations and unions in federal elections,8 but the
prohibitions in the Taft-Hartley Act were difficult to enforce as there
were no disclosure and reporting requirements in the legislation. 9
Congress closed that loophole in the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 ("FECA").'0  In addition to the individual disclosure
requirements, FECA created extensive disclosure provisions for the
political action committee ("PAC") mechanism, which allowed
corporations to pool resources and make direct political contributions
to candidates." Fueled by the Watergate Scandal, Congress
amended FECA in 1974 to place limits on both direct and
independent expenditures.12 The 1974 amendments also established
the Federal Election Commission ("FEC").13  Congress amended
7 Labor-Management Relation (Taft-Hartley) Act, 80 Pub. L. No. 101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)).
Id.
9. Id. This is not to say that there were no disclosure requirements at all for
Federal Elections. The first attempt at a disclosure statute came not long after the
Tillman Act. In 1910 the Publicity of Political Contributions Act called for
disclosure of receipts and expenditures in elections for the House of
Representatives. Publicity of Political Contributions (Publicity) Act, ch. 392, 36
Stat. 822 (1910) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §241 (2006)). In 1911, Congress
added the Senate to the disclosure requirements, and in 1925, under the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, it increased the number of disclosure reports required. See
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, art. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed
1972). See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J.
273, 274 (2010), for a more detailed discussion of the history of disclosure in
federal elections
10 Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. Law No. 92-225, §§ 301-310, 86
Stat. 3 11-19 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)).
" FECA §§ 302-303.
12 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 § 101, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)) (hereinafter FECA 1974).
FECA 1974 limited individual and corporate contributions to $1,000 per candidate
with a total limit of $25,000 per calendar year. Id.
" FECA 1974 at § 310 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1997)).
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FECA again in 1976, after the Supreme Court declared certain
contribution restrictions unconstitutional.14
In 2002, in response to extensive litigation and to shore up
loopholes identified in FECA's regulatory scheme, Congress passed
the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act ("BCRA")." The
BCRA targeted independent expenditures that fell outside of the
express advocacy requirement that was read into FECA's regulations
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" by the Supreme Court.16
To target these non-candidate specific expenditures, the BCRA
rewrote FECA to cover independent expenditures it termed
"electioneering communication. "17 An electioneering
communication is any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication.
. . [that] . . . refers to a clearly identifiable candidate for Federal
Office" and occurs either sixty days before a general election or
thirty days before a primary election." The BCRA then made it
illegal for corporations and unions to use their general treasury funds
to finance electioneering communication. 19 It was over the legality of
this BCRA provision that Citizen's United v. FEC was litigated.20
B. Judicial History
In 1976, the Court heard the first major challenge to the new
regulatory structure created by the FECA amendments of 1974. The
Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, addressed challenges to FECA
contribution limits and mandatory disclosure requirements. FECA
14 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a more detailed discussion
of the Court's decision in Buckley see this article's Judicial History Section, ante at
5.
15 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)).
16 Id. at § 203 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
17 2 U.S.C § 434(f)(3). This was done in response to the narrow
construction of the disclosure requirements and independent expenditure ban that
were given by the Supreme Court in Buckley. See McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 189 (2003) ("The amendment coins a new term,
'electioneering communications,' to replace the narrowing construction of FECA's
disclosure provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley.").
' 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
" 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c).
20 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
559Fall 2011 Citizens United
560 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
provided a statutory limit of $1,000 on direct contributions and a
statutory limit of $1,000 on individual and group independent
contributions "relative to a clearly identifiable candidate." 21 It also
required detailed disclosures by candidates and political committees
of funds contributed to those organizations. 22 Several congressional
and presidential candidates, minor political parties, and candidate
committees soon brought suit in the district court of Washington D.C.
for injunctive relief relating to the above provisions.2 3 The candidates
challenged the facial validity of the contribution and expenditure
ceiling but made an as-applied challenge to the disclosure
requirements. 24
In addressing the contribution and expenditure limits, the
Court first noted that Congress spent a significant amount of time
developing this new statutory scheme, and that it developed an
extensive record of campaign abuses as justifications for its
regulation. 25  At the same time, the Court noted the incredibly
important role political speech played in the United States. 26
Despite the importance of political speech, citing the State's
compelling interest to "limit the actuality and appearance of
21 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24; FECA 1974 at § 101. The $1,000 direct
contribution limit applies to all contributions by "individual[s], partnership[s],
committee[s], association[s], corporation[s] or any other organization or group of
persons." Id. at 23.
22 FECA 1974 at § 204.
23 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
24 Id. A significant aspect of the candidates' argument was that disclosure
was the more appropriate way for the legislature to address campaign finance
reform. They simply argued that since they were independent and minority
candidates, as it applied to them, it was too restrictive. Id. at 8-9.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 18. It is worth noting that previous to Buckley, contributions did
not necessarily equal speech. Id. at 17. The Appellate Court had ruled that
contributions were not speech but conduct, and that any effect they had on speech
was incidental. Id. The Buckley Court held that "[a] restriction on the amount of
money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Id.
at 19. This view of an expenditure limitation as a limitation on the amount of
available speech becomes an important theme in the majority opinion in Citizens
United. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896.
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corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions,"27
the Court upheld the limits on individual direct campaign
contributions.2 8
The Court did not find that same interest as compelling when
addressing the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures. 29  It noted
that, "[u]nlike contributions, such independent expenditures may
provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive." 30 The Court specifically found that the
"absence of prearrangement and coordination . . . alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.""
In addition to a weaker governmental interest, the Court found
that the definition required of the statutory language to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness limited the effectiveness of the statute as
a loop-hole closing provision for those who sought to circumvent the
individual contribution limit.3 2 The Government countered that there
was a First Amendment interest in "equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to
justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of
candidates."33 The Court found that concept "wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed 'to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
27 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
28 Id
29 d. at 45.
301d. at 47.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 44.
"[I]n order to preserve the provision against invalidation on
vagueness grounds, . . . [the independent expenditure limit] . . . must be
construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office . . . . The exacting interpretation of the
statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus
undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision
by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence
upon a candidate or office-holder."
Id. at 44-45.
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
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sources."' 34 "First [Amendment] protection . . . cannot properly be
made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public
discussion." 35
While Buckley addressed independent expenditures generally,
in First National Bank v. Belloti,36 the Court addressed the question
of limitations to indirect expenditures where the statute's scope was
limited to corporations only.3 7  Massachusetts enacted a statute
prohibiting corporations from making expenditures on elections
where the issues involved did not "materially affect any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation. "38 In addition, the
statute explicitly stated that questions submitted to voters regarding
individual income tax shall not be deemed to "materially affect [the]
property, business or assets of the corporation." 39
The corporations seeking to invalidate the statute wanted to
advocate their views with respect to a proposed constitutional
amendment that would permit the Massachusetts Legislature to
impose a graduated income tax on individuals.40 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court found the corporations did not have the same breadth
and scope of First Amendment rights guaranteed to natural persons.4'
In assessing those limited First Amendment rights, the Massachusetts
34 Id. at 49. This becomes the hallmark for the Citizens United majority's
reasoning for why identity based distinctions are impermissible under the First
Amendment. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888-89.
3 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
36 First National Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 765 (1977).
37 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
3 Id.
39 Id.
40 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769. The Massachusetts general assembly had tried
and failed to get this same amendment passed by the populace several times. Id. at
769 n.3. Many saw this measure as preemptively eliminating corporations from the
conversation, to make it easier for the legislature to get the voting public to pass the
amendment.
41 Id. at 778 (citing First National Bank v. Attorney General, 359 N.E.2d
1262 (Mass 1977)). The Massachusetts Court limited the scope of a corporation's
First Amendment rights, "seizing upon the observation that corporations 'cannot
claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.' . . .
[and] concluded that a corporation's First Amendment rights must derive from
its property rights under the Fourteenth." Id. (quoting First National Bank, 359
N.E.2d at 1270).
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Court determined that the corporate speech prohibited by the statute
was not protected speech under the First Amendment.42 Since the
speech was not protected, the Massachusetts Court did not address
the issue of whether states had a compelling interest in inhibiting
corporate speech.43
In reversing, the Supreme Court stated first that the
Massachusetts Court framed the wrong question and erred in not
reaching the First Amendment issue. 44 According to the Court, the
constitutional question was not whether corporations' First
Amendment rights were "coextensive with those of natural
persons."4 5 The question is whether the statute "abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 46 The Court found
the answer to that question simple, as one of the primary purposes of
the First Amendment is to afford the widest possible access to
divergent viewpoints and ideas.47 Viewed from this angle, as an
individual's right to receive as much information as possible from
different points of view, the Court did not see how corporate speech
could not be protected by the First Amendment.4 8
Once the Court determined that corporate speech was
protected under the First Amendment, it then addressed the question
42 Belloti, 435 U.S. at 771.
43 First National Bank, 359 N.E.2d at 1270-72; see Belloti, 435 U.S. at 787
(finding that the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not examine the regulation
under the applicable strict scrutiny standards because it viewed the First
Amendment as not applying to the speech in question).
44 Belloti, 435 U.S. at 775-76.
45Belloti, 435 U.S. at 776.
461 Id. This is read by commentators as giving birth to the notion of hearer's
rights. See Daniel Winik, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer
for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J.
622, 656 (2010). The Court goes on to say: "The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Belloti, 435
U.S. at 777. "The question in this case, simply put, is whether the corporate
identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be
its clear entitlement to protection." Id. at 778. By framing the question in this way,
the Court gets to lead with the protected nature of the speech instead of the possibly
unprotected nature of the speaker.
47 Id. at 783
48 Id.
Citizens United 563Fall 2011
564 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
of whether this otherwise constitutionally permissible speech could
be suppressed based simply upon the corporate identity of the
speaker.4 9 The Government proffered two interests in support of its
opinion that corporate speech could be singled out.5 o First, is the
State's interest in protecting the role of the individual in the election
process and maintaining the individual's confidence in government.'
Second, is the State's interest in protecting shareholder rights. 52
The Court rejects the shareholder argument because the statute
is both underinclusive and overinclusive in its coverage. 53  In
assessing the State's anti-corruption interest, the Court placed
significant weight on the fact that the expenditure bar related to
referenda and not to candidate elections. 5 4 The Court did not find the
State's interests in limiting corporate speech in the referendum
context to be sufficient in light of the First Amendment interest in
"affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas."55  The Court found the
49 Id. at 778.
501d. at 787.
51 Belloti, 435 U.S. at 787. While the Court uses fancier words, it is
referring to the anti-corruption interest that was offered in Buckley. See id. at 788-
89 (citing Buckley's anti-corruption interest).
52 Id. at 787.
53 Id. at 793-95. The statue is underinclusive because it only relates to
referendum and not to other legislative activities. Id. at 793. The statute is
overinclusive because even if all shareholders unanimously authorized the
expenditure, the corporation still could not contribute money. Id. at 795.
4 Id. at 789-90. While part of this differentiation had to do with the
intrinsic difference between referenda and elections; "[rieferenda are held on
issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases
involving candidate elections .. . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
issue." Id. at 790. The Court did note that "[i]f appellee's arguments were
supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened
imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration." Id. at 789.
* Id. at 783. The Court connects up its press cases to its general
commercial cases in finding that it is not just the press corporations' unique
position in stewarding information to the public but the general interest in a wide
dissemination of the largest possible set of ideas. Id at 798 (Burger, J.,
concurring).
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legislature unqualified to "dictat[e] the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." 56
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce," the Court
addressed an as-applied and facial challenge to the Michigan
Campaign Finance Act of 1976 ("Michigan Act"). 8 Section 54(1) of
the Michigan Act prohibited corporations from using general treasury
funds for expenditures relating to any candidate for state office.
Corporations were allowed to make expenditures out of segregated
funds raised solely for political purposes, similar to the PAC
requirement under federal election law.6 0  The Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit corporation, brought the
challenge to the statute on First Amendment grounds.61
Although the Court found that the statute's requirements did
not completely stifle corporate "expressive activity," 62 it recognized
that the obstacles inherent in maintaining segregated funds did
burden a corporation's ability to engage in political discourse.63
The Court did not address the issue of whether the State had a
compelling interest in regulating against the danger of quid pro quo
64 F oncorruption. It found, instead, that the Michigan Act's regulation
was aimed at the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
16 Id. at 785 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972)). The Court found this especially true "where, as here, the legislature's
suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is
plainly offended." Id. at 785-86.
* Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
58 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts. 388.
5 Michigan Campaign Finance Act § 54(1), 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts. 388
(codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 169.254(1) (1979)).
60 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-433, 441b(b) (2009).
61 Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
62 Id. at 658.
63 In Fed. Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 259-65 (1986) (hereinafter MCFL), the Court had held that 2 U.S.C. §
441b, which requires corporations to segregate funds in a similar way to section
54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, overly burdened corporate freedom
of expression as applied to a small non-profit organization.
64 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
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support for the corporation's political ideas."65 Since the state-
conferred structure facilitated a corporation's ability to amass large
quantities of wealth, it warranted the limits on expenditures. 6 6
In light of this compelling governmental interest, the Court
assessed whether the Michigan Act was narrowly tailored or
overinclusive in its scope. 67  The Court found that because the
Michigan Act did not impose an absolute ban but allowed
corporations to make expenditures through segregated funds, the
statute was narrowly tailored to "precisely [target] . . . the distortion
caused by corporate spending . . . ."68 In response to the over-
inclusive argument, the Court noted that it had already rejected a
similar argument to a challenge to a federal statute because it is not
only the actual influence of the vast sums of monies but the
"potential for such influence that demands regulation." 69
Responding to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's as-
applied challenge, the Court noted that it had previously upheld the
as-applied challenges of non-profit corporations where the
corporation had "features more akin to voluntary political
associations than business firms, and therefore should not have to
bear burdens on independent spending solely because of [its]
incorporated status."70 The Court emphasized that this was not based
exclusively on non-profit status, and that the Chamber was not the
65 Id. at 659-60. While not exactly quid pro quo corruption, the Court
recognized, and most commentators agreed, that this was merely an extension of
the anti-corruption interest. Id. The majority opinion in Citizens United does not
treat it as an extension of the anti-corruption interest but as its own discrete
government interest. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
66 Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59.
67 Id. at 660-61.
68 Id. at 660.
69Id. at 661(original emphasis omitted).
7 Id. (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263). The Court noted three
characteristics that were integral to its holding in MCFL: "that the organization
'was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot
engage in business activities,"' "the absence of 'shareholders or other persons
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings,"' and "the organization's
independence from the influence of business corporations." Id. at 662-64 (quoting
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
31-2
type of non-profit organization that is excluded from the types of
expenditure restrictions contained in the Michigan Act.n
In McConnell v. FEC,72 the Court heard a challenge to a
number of provisions of the newly enacted BCRA, including the first
challenge to its disclosure requirements and restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures as they related to "electioneering
communication."7 3 In contrast to the language adopted in FECA,74
the Court upheld the actual definition of "electioneering
communication" against a challenge that it was unconstitutionally
vague.75
The Court upheld the disclosure provision, citing the anti-
corruption interest noted in Buckley and the important function of
"gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive
electioneering restrictions .. "7 The Court specifically noted that it
was disturbed by the fact that under then-current law, corporations
were not only permitted to fund this type of advocacy through their
71 Id. at 664.
72 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
7n 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2009)); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-209. This was a
consolidation of multiple actions challenging the constitutionality of the BCRA.
Id. A summary of the challenges included challenges to: (1) the political party
and candidate 'soft money' ban, (2) the ban on party donations to tax-exempt
entities, (3) the ban on the use of 'soft money' for issue ads which clearly identified
a candidate, (4) the statutory definition of "electioneering communication," (5) the
categorization of coordinated third-party issue ads as campaign contributions, (6)
the PAC requirement for expenditures by unions and corporations, (7) the
prohibition on political donations by minors, and (8) the broadcaster disclosure
requirements. Id. at 114-22. Because the scope of the Citizen 's United challenge
to the BCRA was limited to the disclosure and independent expenditure
requirements of the statute, I will limit my discussion to those in this summary.
74 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 (construing "relative to a clearly identifiable
candidate" as only applying to express advocacy for election or defeat).
7 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194. The Court made it clear that the "express
advocacy" construction adopted in Buckley "was the product of statutory
interpretation rather than a constitutional command." Id. at 192. Nothing in the
First Amendment required that a regulation of independent expenditures relate only
to "express advocacy." Id. at 193.
76 Id. at 196.
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general funds but that the law "permit[ed] them to do so while
concealing their identities from the public." 77
With respect to BCRA's regulation of the use of general
treasury funds for independent expenditures, the Court found that
issue ads," broadcast during the thirty and sixty day windows as
prohibited by BCRA § 203, "are the functional equivalent of express
advocacy." 79 As such, the same interest identified in Austin, to limit
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth," applied, and the regulation was held valid.80
BCRA's regulation of corporate independent expenditures was
challenged again in 2007. In Fed. Election Comm 'n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life,81 the Court heard an as-applied challenge brought to
BCRA section 203's independent expenditure ban. 82  Wisconsin
Right to Life was a non-profit organization that, as part of its
activities, aired ads in 2004 leading up to the primary election.83
77 Id. at 196. In its general discussion on issue advertising, the Court noted
some egregious examples of companies using misleading names. Id. at 126-29
(citing a pharmaceutical company calling itself "Citizens for Better Medicare" for
the purpose of an issue ad).
78 The Court used the term "issue advocacy" to refer to this type of
corporate independent expenditure throughout its opinion. (CITE????)
79 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
80 Id. at 205. In sustaining this interest, the Court noted a number of post-
Austin decisions that re-affirmed the Austin anti-distortion interest. See e.g., Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003); Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S 197, 209-10 (1982).
8 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007)
(hereinafter WRTL II). In Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 546 U.S.
410 (2006) (hereinafter WRTL I), the Court heard a challenge brought as to whether
the Court's jurisprudence precluded as-applied challenges to BCRA §section 203.
Id. at 411. After determining that Austin and McConnell explicitly left open the
door to the appropriate as-applied challenge, the Court remanded the parties back
down to the trial court. Id. at 412. The trial court then found that BCRA section
203 did not apply to Wisconsin Right to Life's proposed ads because the ads were
truly issue ads instead of the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Wis. Right
to life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 466 F.Supp.2d 195, 207-208 (D.D.C. 2006).
82 WRTL II, U.S. 551 U.S. at 456. For the sake of this litigation Wisconsin
Right to Life conceded that their ads were prohibited by BCRA section 203. Id. at
464.
8 Id. at 458-59.
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In addressing the challenge, the Court reviewed its decision in
McConnell to determine the scope of indirect expenditures that
would be considered the functional equivalent of express advocacy. 84
After noting the potential for chilling political speech that was issue
advocacy and not candidate advocacy, the Court determined that "an
ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate."85
III. ANALYSIS
In addition to the background, procedural history, and analysis
of the two sections of the majority opinion, this article - partly
because of the five-four nature of the primary holding and to give a
more rounded view of the issues presented - will analyze separately
Justice Stevens's dissent and the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia. While the concurrences are published in
front of the dissent in the opinion, this article reverses the order here,
as the concurrences are a direct response to arguments raised in
Stevens's dissent.
A. Background of the Case
1. Facts
In 2008, Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, brought a
challenge to the BCRA's prohibition against "electioneering
84 Id. at 456.
8s Id. at 469-70. The FEC had proposed a subjective intent-based test. Id. at
468. The Court rejected the intent-based approach and adopted an objective
standard because it felt that:
Far from serving the values the First Amendment is meant to
protect, an intent-based test would chill core political speech by
opening the door to a trial on every ad within the terms of § 203, on
the theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an election, no
matter how compelling the indications that the ad concerned a
pending legislative or policy issue. Id.
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communication." 8 6  Citizens United desired to distribute a film
entitled Hillary: The Movie ("Hillary ") through a digital cable video-
on-demand service. 8 7  To promote the video-on-demand release,
Citizens United produced three commercial ads regarding Hillary."
Citizens United wished to finance the release and commercials
through funds in its general treasury, and sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, arguing that BCRA's ban on expenditures was
unconstitutional as-applied to Hillary, and that BCRA's disclaimer
and disclosure requirements were unconstitutional as-applied to
Hillary and the three commercials. 89
2. Procedural History
The D.C. District Court denied the injunctive relief, both on
facial constitutional grounds and as-applied to Hillary.90 It also
rejected the challenge to the disclaimer and disclosure requirements,
noting that "the Supreme Court has written approvingly of disclosure
provisions triggered by political speech even though the speech itself
was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment." 91
86 2 U.S.C § 441b (2009). FEC regulation further defines the distribution
requirements of an "electioneering communication." 11 CFR § 100.29(a)(2)
(2009). See 11 CFR § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2009) (defining public distribution with
respect to presidential candidates as any communication that "[c]an be received by
50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election . .. is being held within
30 days").
87 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. The film was already available
through theaters and on DVD. Id. These distribution methods were not considered
to be in violation of the statute either by the government or Citizens United. Id. at
888.
" Id. at 887. The Court specifically noted that all three of the proposed ads
contained a "pejorative" statement regarding then-Senator Clinton. Id.
89 Id. at 888.
90 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279
(D.D.C. 2008).
91 Id. at 281.
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B. Majority
The Court's opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission92 is appropriately split into two parts. First is the five-
four split decision invalidating the corporate independent
expenditures ban. 93 Second is the eight-one decision upholding the
mandatory disclaimer and disclosure requirements. 94
1. The Corporate Independent Expenditures Ban
Justice Kennedy first addressed whether the case could or
should be resolved on narrow statutory interpretation grounds. 95
Specifically, Citizens United raised four different grounds for finding
Hillary outside the regulatory authority of federal election statutes:
(1) that Hillary did not qualify as "electioneering communication"
under section 441b, (2) that, under the approach taken in WRTL II
section 441b could not be applied to Hillary, (3) that ads delivered
through video-on-demand services in general should be exempted
from the definition of "electioneering communication," and (4) that
an exception should be carved out from section 441b's regulatory
scope for non-profit organizations overwhelmingly funded by
individuals. 96
Principally, Kennedy looked at whether the content of Hillary
qualified as "electioneering communication." 97  Citizens United's
major contention was that Hillary was not publicly distributed under
the requirements of FEC regulations because each purchase through
92 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
9 Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Alito. Justice Thomas joined all but Part IV of the opinion.
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor joined Part IV of the majority
opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Alito joined in
full and Justice Thomas joined in part. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence
joined by Justice Alito. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 886.
9 Justice Thomas was the sole dissenting voice for this section of the
opinion. Id.
95 Id. at 888-96.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 888.
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the video-on-demand service would be a separate, distinct individual
purchase. 98 The Court found this statutory interpretation implausible
because the regulation itself instructs that it is not the nature of who
receives the transmission, but the number of cable subscribers in the
relevant area. 99
Second, Citizens United argued that the ban could not be
applied to Hillary under the "express advocacy" approach taken in
WRTL II.1oo As previously mentioned, in WRTL II, the Court
determined that communication "is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy only if . .. [it] . . . is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate."'o In deciding that Hillary is the equivalent of express
advocacy, the Court noted that the movie was essentially an extended
negative advertisement against Clinton's presidential campaign. 102
Thirdly, Citizens United argued that video-on-demand, as a
particular delivery vehicle for content, did not pose the same level of
distortion risk as broadcast television, and therefore, should be
treated differently.10 3 The Court discards this argument as outside
the purview of judicial review.' 04
98 Id See supra text accompanying note 86 for a description of the FEC's
regulatory requirements regarding whether a communication is "publicly
distributed," and therefore falls within the scope of communication regulated by
section 441b.
99 11 CFR §§ 100.29(b)(7)(i)(G)(ii).
100 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889-90.
101 WRTL II, U.S. 551 at 469-70.
102 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890. Citizens United contended that the
movie was merely a historical documentary. Id. The Court noted that throughout
the movie, the commentators referred to Senator Hillary's potential candidacy,
including discussing policies they predicted she would pursue. Id.
'o' Id. The basis for this argument was the voluntary nature of the video-
on-demand service. A viewer is subjected to commercials not because of personal
choice but because they are attached to a particular program the viewer likes. Id.
On the other hand, video-on-demand only reaches an audience that actively
chooses to access and view the material. Id.
104 Id. Specifically, the Court says that "[w]hile some means of
communication may be less effective than others at influencing the public in
different contexts, any effort by the Judiciary to decide which means of
communications are to be preferred for the particular type of message and speaker
would raise questions as to the courts' own lawful authority." Id.
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Finally, Citizens United requested that the Court carve out an
exception to the BCRA's ban on corporate "electioneering
communications" where the corporation funding the speech is a non-
profit and the speech is predominantly funded by individuals."os In
finding this solution distasteful, the Court emphasized that for the
extensive judicial revision necessary, case-by-case determinations
that would need to be made, resulting in the chilling of "archetypical
political speech."106
In addition to the insufficiencies the Court found in Citizens
United's arguments for a narrow ruling, the Court supplied three
reasons for deciding to resolve the dispute on the grounds of a facial
challenge to the statute.10 7  First, the Court cited its ambiguous
litigation position of the government.0 8 Second, the Court argued
that the substantial time necessary to clarify the statute, if it were to
take a judicial scalpel to it, would chill too much speech.' 09 Third,
the Court reemphasized the importance of "speech itself to the
integrity of the election process.""10  As a result of these
considerations, the Court found it necessary to examine a facial
attack on section 441b's ban on political speech, and, as a result, its
own decision in Austin.111
105 Id. In MCFL, the Court carved out an exception to restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures as applied to non-profit corporations that did
not accept donations from for-profit corporations and labor unions, and only
engaged in the promotion of political ideas. The McConnell court recognized an
extension of that principle to BCRA's Wellstone Amendment. McConnell, 540
U.S. at 209; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6). Citizens United essentially asks for the Court to
expand the definition of a qualifying MCFL non-profit entity and create a de
minimis application of the MCFL rule. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891.
106 Id. at 892.
107 Id. at 894-96.
108 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894. Specifically, the Court cites the fact
that the government argued that one of Citizens United's applied challenges might
have merit. It seems questionable though to punish the government from utilizing
their right to argue a case in the alternative.
'
0 9 Id. at 895.
110 Id.
" Id. at 896. Citizens United never actually asked the court to review the
facial constitutionality of section 441b. Instead, after oral arguments, the Court,
sua sponte, asked the parties to brief the question of facial validity; specifically
whether it should overrule its own precedent in Austin and McConnell.
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Before dissecting the validity of its decision in Austin, the
Court examined the scope of speech chilled by section 441b's ban.112
This examination was twofold; including looking at whether the PAC
exemption was relevant to its examination of First Amendment
concerns and whether the regulation could be characterized as one of
time, place, and manner instead of an outright ban.113
While noting that PAC's were designed as a vehicle for the
speech of members of the corporate apparatus and were exempt from
the speech ban under section 441b, the Court decided that this
exception did not alleviate any First Amendment concerns regarding
the chilling of corporate speech because of the burdensome
requirements to create a PAC.'1 4 Specifically, the Court notes the
expense of creating a PAC and the extensive government regulation
involved in administering them.115 Further, the Court dismisses any
time, place, and manner argument for the regulation on the grounds
that "[i]f [section] 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe
that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech."ll 6
After resolving concerns regarding the scope and level of
review, as well as the breadth of the statutes' ban, the Court
addressed the state of its own precedent with regard to a fundamental
feature of the statute, namely, the relationship Citizens United's
corporate status had on its First Amendment rights to free speech."
The Majority is adamant, and the dissent does not disagree,
that First Amendment considerations do not disappear when the
12 Id. at 897. The Court gives some highly provocative examples of
potentially chilled speech including Sierra Club, NRA, and American Civil
Liberties Union ads. Id.
" Id. The Court feels it necessary to throw into its argument that, if
section 441b applied to individuals, that "no
114 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. A multitude of previous cases noted
that the PAC exception created an avenue for corporations and Unions to make
independent expenditures from their general treasuries that were otherwise
restricted by federal regulations. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 203-04; Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162-63. The purpose of this inquiry into the
nature of the PAC's was to allow the Court to conclude that section 441b was an
outright ban on corporate political speech. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.
"
5 Id.
116 Id. at 898.
"' Id. at 899-900.
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speaker is a corporation.118  The Court's precedent is clear in that
respect. 9 The first question then is whether the First Amendment
protection afforded corporations is coexistent with that afforded
individuals.120 On this question, the Court notes a split in authority
between its decisions in Buckley and Austin. 12 1
As noted, the Buckley Court upheld FECA's ban on direct
contributions but invalidated its ceiling on independent
expenditures.12 2 Buckley's direct progeny extended that analysis to
conclude that there is "no support in the First . .. Amendment, or in
the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that
otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment
loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation ...
"9123
In contrast, the Austin Court, after recognizing a new
compelling government interest in preventing "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas," found valid the restrictions on independent expenditures
based upon a speaker's corporate identity.' 24
As the anti-distortion rationale was the major distinguishing
factor between the two lines of authority, it was the first issue
addressed by the majority in reviewing its precedent and attacking
118 Id. at 899; id. at 951-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 899 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n. 14).
120 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (discussing the background of the
court's precedent regarding the extent of a corporation's right to speak, but also the
right of individuals to hear that speech).
121 Id. at 903.
122 See supra pp. 4-5, for the detailed analysis of the Buckley court's
reasoning for the distinction between the different types of expenditures.
123 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798).
The majority here does recognize that there is a narrow class of speech restrictions
based upon speaker identity that were upheld by the Court, but it emphasized that
those restrictions were based upon an "interest in allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions." See id. at 899 (recognizing the public function exception
with respect to; public schools, penitentiaries, military, and government
employees).
124 Id. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
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the validity of the statute. 125  It then addressed the other three
grounds proposed by the government, namely: the anti-corruption
interest as identified in Buckley, a proposed dissenting shareholder
interest, and a proposed interest in "preventing foreign individuals or
associations from influencing our Nation's political process."' 26
The anti-distortion rationale is premised on the theory that a
corporation's superior spending power and potential immortality give
it an advantage with regard to political funding, such that they can
distort the presentation of issues to the public. 127 The Court wasted
no time in rejecting the theory that a corporation's wealth, amassed in
the economic market place, gives it an unfair advantage with regard
to expression in the political marketplace.128 Further, the Court said
that, even if it did recognize such an advantage, the government has
no interest at all in equalizing the ability of individuals and groups to
influence elections.129 It also concluded that, "[t]he rule that political
speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's wealth is a necessary
consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally
prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's
identity."130
The Court further analogizes the Austin rule to media
corporations and argues that (1) under Austin's framework wealthy
media conglomerates would have their voices diminished relative to
other media conglomerates and (2) that conglomerates that owned a
125 Id. at 904-08.
126 Id. at 911.
127 Id. at 904 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 659). For a more detailed
discussion of Austin and the anti-distortion rationale, See supra pp. 10-11.
128 Id. The Court again argues that, because the Government argued all of
the rationales in the alternative, that someone's argument for the continued use of
Austin's anti-distortion rationale was weakened. Id. (citing Tr. Of Oral Arg. 45-48
(Sept. 9, 2009)).
129 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. The equalization interest was first
proposed and rejected in Buckley.
130 Id. at 905. See supra text accompanying note 123, for the public
function exception to the general identity-based ban on speech regulations. The
Court also rejected the skyrocketing costs of political campaigns as either a ground
for the government's interest or a result of the distortion in the political arena.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
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media business would have an advantage with respect to
conglomerates that did not own a media business.13 1
Even if the Court had agreed with the anti-distortion argument,
it found that the current statute did not actually address the issue of
amassed wealth, as it subjected all corporations of any size to the
same restrictions.132  The Court ends its lambasting of the anti-
distortion rationale in Austin by concluding that any situation where
the government uses its power to control an individual's source of
information is illegal censorship to control thought. 133
After failing to find the anti-distortion rationale to substantiate
any governmental interest, let alone a substantial one, the Court
examined whether section 441b could be supported by the corruption
interest noted in Buckley.134  While the Court questioned the
necessity of the regulation of direct expenditures because bribery
" Id. at 905-06. The Majority seems to argue in the same breadth that it is
unfair that the Media Corporation Exception treats media corporations differently
than other corporations, and that the framers would never allow restrictions on
media corporations because of the unique position occupied by those same
corporations. Id. at 905. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i). The
strength of this assertion is further diminished as it is drawn from a dissenting
opinion, which itself, cites other dissenting opinions as its source. Id. at 905 (citing
Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See id. at 707 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). This leads credence to Justice Stevens's complaint that the Majority's
opinion is simply based upon a long line of dissents explicitly rejected by the
Court. Id. at 962.
132 Id. at 906-07. The Court notes that a vast majority of corporations are
small (fewer than 100 employees). Id. at 907. The Court attempts to analogize this
ban to the government banning the speech of associations of citizens. Id. at 908.
This seems a bit of a stretch as aliens can and do own shares of corporations, and
those same individuals associated with the corporation are free to create a PAC for
the expression of their political goals and are free to petition to the legislature and
administrative agencies. See id. at 907. The court also uses this fact as a reason for
why the anti-distortion interest itself is aberrant, which seems to be misplaced. Just
because a statute does not protect a proposed interest, does not make the interest
itself non-existent. See id at 907 (calling the anti-distortion interest aberrant
because it does not limit all avenues of corporate political expression). The Court
attempts to further justify its stance by pointing out that large corporations
routinely counsel members of congress in private, which means that the corporate
ban will have a further disproportionate effect in that large corporations still have
an avenue for expression that small corporations are shut out from. Id. at 907-08.
133 Id. at 908.
134 Id.
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laws already covered the quid pro quo activity in question, it
recognized that the appearance of corruption was a sufficient interest
to support the government's regulation of direct expenditures.13 5
When turning to the independent expenditure ban under
section 441b, the Court agreed with the analysis in Buckley that
"[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with a candidate . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate."1 36 For that reason, the Court found that "independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise
to corruption or the appearance of corruption."m137
With respect to the final two proposed interests, shareholder
protection and foreign influence, the Court quickly swept them
aside. 38  It found that the Shareholder Protection interest, like the
anti-distortion interest, would ban too much speech. 13 9 It also found
internal corporate governance sufficient to protect shareholders that
may dissent from the corporation's choice of political
expenditures.1 4 0 Because of the broad scope of the section 441 ban,
the Court found that even if it did recognize an interest in preventing
foreign influence in the national political process, the current statute
would be overbroad.14 1
135 Id.
"3 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
117 Id. The majority attempts to draw a distinction between the permissible
government interest "appearance of corruption" and what it terms as the
"appearance of influence." Id. at 909-910. While correctly noting that "[t]he fact
that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean
that these officials are corrupt," this seems to be simply shades of gray from the
appearance of corruption as described in Buckley, which the Court relies upon. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. The Court also chooses to ignore extensive legislative
history and proceedings by noting the similarities between independent and direct
expenditures that Congress based FECA, and then the BCRA, on. See McConnell,
540 U.S. at 126-127.
1 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
139 Id. (noting that recognizing this interest would allow the government to
ban the speech of media corporations).
140 Id. "There is . little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy."' Id. (quoting
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
141Id. at 911.
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The majority found all four proposed interests, including
Austin's anti-corruption interest, to be insufficient to support the
restrictions that section 441b imposed on core political speech. As
such, it expressly rejected Austin and overruled the part of
McConnell that followed Austin's analysis. 142
2. Disclaimer and Disclosure Provisions
Citizens United's second challenge in the case was to the
disclaimer and disclosure provisions in BCRA sections 311 and
201.143 Citizens United objected to the application of the provisions
as applied to Hillary and its advertisements. 14 4
As previously noted, in Buckley, the Court recognized a
"governmental interest in 'provid[ing] the electorate with
information' about the sources of election-related spending." 14 5 But
while the statutes were facially upheld in Buckley and McConnell, the
142 Id. at 913. The Majority ends its argument for overruling Austin in a
confusing way. It implies that since speakers continue to find inventive ways to
circumvent campaign finance laws, regulations are impotent and should be
abandoned. See id. at 912 ("Austin is undermined by experience since its
announcement. Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find
ways to circumvent campaign finance laws.").
143 Id. at 913. The disclaimer provision requires that any electioneering
communication funded by someone other than the candidate, shown on television,
must include a disclaimer indicating who is responsible for the ad. 2 U.S.C. §
441d(d)(2). Additionally the ad must be displayed for at least four seconds, in a
clearly readable and spoken manner, indicate that it is not authorized by the
candidate, and indicate the website of the authorizing party. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3).
The Disclosure provision requires that, where a person spends more than $10,000
on electioneering communication within a calendar year, they must disclose that
spending to the FEC indicating who made the expenditure, the amount of the
expenditure, the election the expenditure was directed at and the names of
contributors. 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(l)-(2).
144 Citizens United aired two ten second ads and one thirty second ad to
promote Hillary. Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 914.
145 Id at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66). The standard of review
employed for the disclaimer and disclosure requirements is lower than that applied
to the independent expenditure ban. Because disclaimer and disclosure
requirements "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," Citizens United
130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64), the government need only
supply a sufficiently important governmental interest, which substantially relates to
the government's end. Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 914.
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Court left open the possibility of a successful as-applied challenge "if
a group could show a 'reasonable probability' that disclosure of its
contributors' names 'will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties."' 46
Citizens United objected to the application of the BCRA's
disclaimer and disclosure requirements for the Hillary
advertisements, and to Hillary itself, on six grounds: (1) that the
disclaimer requirements for "electioneering communication" did not
apply to a commercial advertisement; 14 7 (2) that section 311 of the
BCRA is under inclusive in scope because its coverage does not
extend to print or internet advertising;148 (3) that the effectiveness of
its speech is diminished by the loss of four seconds in each
advertisement dedicated to disclaimers;149 (4) that the disclosure
requirements in section 201 should be "confined to speech that is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy;"' 50 (5) that the disclosure
of the funding sources of the ads themselves would not help viewers
make an informed choice as to watching Hillary itself, as the funding
for Hillary is not disclosed;' 5' and (6) "that disclosure requirements
can chill donations [to an organization] by exposing donors to
retaliation."152
Addressing these arguments in turn, the Court immediately
rejected the contention that commercial advertisements necessarily
fall outside the definition of an "electioneering communication."153
Citing the repeated direct references to then-Senator Clinton in the
146 Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198).
147 Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 914-15.
148 Id. at 915.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 885.
153 Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 885. The Court notes that there is a
difference between the scope of the disclaimer and disclosure requirements and the
independent expenditure ban. Id. Under FEC regulation, ads that "propose a
commercial transaction" are not subject to the expenditure ban under section 441b
but are subject to the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of sections 441d(2),
441d(a)(3), and 434(f)(l)-(2). Id.
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advertisement itself, the Court found that the ads fell within the
definition of "electioneering communication." 54
The Court noted that the under-inclusive and effectiveness
arguments of the disclaimer, provisions were already tendered to the
Court in McConnell.155  The Court in McConnell rejected the
argument on the grounds that the government has an important
interest in "shedding the light of publicity on campaign financing."156
The Court here extends that rejection to include the pertinence of
those arguments to the disclosure provisions in the BCRA.'
The Court immediately rejected any argument that the
requirements of section 201 be construed as narrowly as Citizens
United requested.' 5 8 The Court emphasized that disclosure is "a less
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations" and that it
has upheld disclosure requirements on a broad range of activities,
including those of lobbyists.' 59
The Court found the argument that the public's interest in the
funding for the ads themselves was somehow diminished because of
their commercial nature, or the fact that their funding was separate
from the movie itself, to be similar to Citizen United's first argument
regarding "electioneering communications."1 6 0 Citizen United's first
argument emphasized that even if the ads themselves "only pertain to
a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who
is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election."161
While Citizens United's contention of potentially chilled
speech raised concerns for the Court, it found no facts that indicated
that, as-applied to Citizens United's activities, the disclosure
requirements have or will cause its members to face threats or
otherwise be put in danger.' 6 2 Thus, despite the existence of some
1541d
154 Id.
156 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81).
157 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
158 Id.
159 Id
161 Id
162 Id. at 916. As a matter of fact, the Court indicates that the facts showed
that Citizens United had been disclosing its donors for years without a single
instance of harassment or threats. Id. This concern is the primary thrust of Justice
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amici briefs that indicated the existence of harassment and threats to
the donors of some organizations, the Court determined that the
disclosure requirements did not have a chilling effect on Citizens
United's potential political speech.163
In closing, in consideration of Citizens United's arguments
against the disclosure and disclaimer requirements of the BCRA, the
Court emphasized how critical those requirements were to its vision
of First Amendment protections of political discourse:
A campaign finance system that pairs corporate
independent expenditures with effective disclosure has
not existed before today . . . [w]ith the advent of the
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide
shareholders and citizens with the information needed to
hold corporations and elected officials accountable for
their positions and supporters. Shareholders can
determine whether their corporation's political speech
advances the corporation's interest in making profits,
and citizens can see whether elected officials are "in the
pocket" of so-called moneyed interest . . . . The First
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech
of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and
messages. 164
Thomas's lone dissent from the Court's decision regarding the disclosure and
disclaimer requirements. Id. at 980-82. Justice Thomas cites to the recent activities
surrounding a constitutional amendment passed in California that outlawed gay
marriage. Id. Several high profile donors to the amendment's campaign were
forced to resign from their work after artists who opposed the act threatened to
boycott their employers. Id. at 981. To Justice Thomas, "[t]he success of such
intimidation tactics has . . . spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed
donor information to pre-empt citizens' exercise of their First Amendment rights."
Id.
163 Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 916.
6 Id.
C. Dissent
Justice Stevens's dissent attacks the majority opinion on
multiple grounds: the scope of the Court's own authorized review,
the ability to decide the case on narrow grounds, the appropriate
weight to give the doctrine of stare decisis, whether BCRA's
regulation of corporate spending amounted to a "ban" of the political
speech in question, the permissibility of identity based distinctions in
First Amendment jurisprudence, and "ancient First Amendment
principles."165
After analyzing the weaknesses Stevens saw in those
principles, he revisits the government's interests in upholding the
BCRA's regulation of corporate expenditures and finds the
Anticorruption Interest, Antidistortion Interest, and Shareholder
Protection Interests to all be viable bases for upholding the
regulation.166 The dissent's primary position is simple, they believe
that "[t]he conceit that corporations must be treated identically to
natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also
inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case."' 6 7
1. Narrow Grounds for Review
Before reaching the interests of the case, Stevens attacked the
majority's decision on a procedural ground. Under Supreme Court
Rule 14.1(a) "only questions set forth in the petition, or fairly
included therein, will be considered by the Court."168 Citizens
United never requested a facial review of section 203.169 The
question presented to the Court was whether, as-applied to Hillary,
section 203 applied.o70  Besides the philosophical view that by
resorting to a facial challenge "[t]he Court operates with a sledge
165 Id. at 929-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 952-79.
1671 Id. at 930.
168 Id. at 931 n. 2.
169 Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 931 n. 2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Id. As previously mentioned, the Court itself requested that the parties
submit briefs on the facial constitutionality of the regulations. See supra note 11
and accompanying text.
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hammer rather than a scalpel." 7 1  The root of Justice Stevens's
objection to the Court considering a facial challenge to the statute at
such a late date lies in the lack of relevant evidence to make any
credible determination regarding the statute's affect on corporate and
union political speech.17 2  Contra "Congress crafted BCRA in
response to a virtual mountain of research on the corruption that
previous legislation had failed to avert." 73 Stevens does acquiesce
that in some limited circumstances the court may turn an as-applied
challenge into a facial challenge when there "is a judicial
determination that the legislature acted with an impermissible
purpose in enacting a provision, as this carries the necessary
implication that all future as-applied challenges to the provision must
prevail." 74
In addition, Stevens argues that the narrow grounds proposed
by both the government and Citizens United are not only viable
options but are more appropriate than reaching the constitutional
issue at all. 175
Because video-on-demand services were in their infancy when
the BCRA was crafted by Congress, it is reasonable to presume that
they did not intend to qualify this type of service as "electioneering
communication" under the statute.' 76 This is an argument that gains
traction based upon the legislation sponsors' own confusion
171 Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. "Had Citizens United maintained a facial challenge ... the parties
could have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a record about the
actual effects of § 203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of
corporations and unions." Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 935-36.
175 Id. at 937. "[If it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to
decide more." PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin, 362 F.3d 786, 799
(C.A.D.C. 2004).
176 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens
further notes that the congressional record developed for McConnell was squarely
focused on ads that appeared on television, which is a very different type of forced
presentation than video-on-demand, which requires the proactive step of program
selection. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207).
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regarding the scope of BCRA's coverage and where video-on-
demand services fall.177
Citizens United requested that the Court rule that non-profits,
such as itself, that "accept only a de minimis amount of money from
for-profit corporations," be exempted from the BCRA's coverage by
expanding the non-profit exception under MCFL.178
Finally, if the Court insisted on reaching the constitutional
issue, the Court could have simply upheld Citizen United's as-
applied challenge.1 79
As outraged as the dissent was regarding the Court's insistence
on reaching the facial constitutional issue, Justice Stevens could not
understand why, in this particular circumstance, the Court chose to
directly overrule Austin.' While Stevens admits that he is "not an
absolutist when it comes to stare decisis, in the campaign finance
area or in any other," 81 he does feel that "if this principle is to do any
meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least
demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five
Justices, for overturning settled doctrine."' 82
Particular to Stevens's objection is the Court's disregard of
standard principles for determining the continued validity of
precedent, namely, "the antiquity of the precedent, the workability of
its legal rule, and the reliance interests at stake." 83
In addressing the reliance interests at stake here, Stevens notes
that legislatures, both federal and state, have relied on the Court's
177 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Amici
Curiae Brief for Senator John McCain et al. at 17-19).
1I Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
notes that a number of lower courts had already "held that de minimis business
support does not, in itself, remove an otherwise qualifying organization from the
ambit of MCFL." See id. at 937 n. 14 (citing Colorado Right to Life Comm., Inc.
v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1148 (C.A. 2007)).
179 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 938. The dissent's suspicion was that "[t]he only thing preventing
the majority from affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower ground that
would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin." Id.
181 Id.
18 2 Id.
183 Id. at 940. The majority does mention the traditional concerns for stare
decisis; however, as the dissent alleges, it does not use them in any real way to
discuss whether it should address overturning this decision. See id. at 912.
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decision in Austin for the past two decades to shape campaign
finance reform.184 To throw out the decision in Austin now throws
the entire campaign finance reform field in disarray, and hampers
"the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective
and coherent fashion."185
Interconnected with the legislatures' past reliance on the
precedent is the fact that Austin has been on the books for over two
decades with no intervening changes in condition that signal either its
unconstitutionality or unworkability.186  As a point of emphasis,
Stevens reminds the majority that merely two terms previously, the
WRTL II court, in an opinion drafted by Chief Justice Roberts, upheld
Austin. 8 7
As a further comment on the workability of the legal rule
espoused, Justice Stevens notes that the Chief Justice's opinion in
WRTL crafted a rule "with the express goal of maximizing clarity and
administrability" of BCRA's regulatory impact.188
Stevens concedes that the majority bases its own stare decisis
argument on the belief that Austin departs dramatically from First
Amendment precedent.'8 9 This departure, if Stevens agreed with
their argument, would be a compelling reason to depart from Austin's
reasoning.' 90 Stevens is disconcerted though by the majority's failure
to consider the traditional factors for determining the weight given to
precedential authority.191 This, coupled with the pejorative stigma
184 Id. at 940. The dissent frames the reliance interest well, "[s]tare decisis
has special force when legislators or citizens 'have acted in reliance on a previous
decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights
and expectations or require an extensive legislative response."' Id. at 940 (quoting
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995)).
1' Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 940-41.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 941 n. 28.
190 See id. at 939.
191 See supra text accompanying note 183.
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the majority attaches to the Austin opinion itself,192 leads Stevens to
claim that:
In the end, the Court's rejection of Austin and McConnell
comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with
their results. Virtually every one of its arguments was
made and rejected in those cases, and the majority
opinion is essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated
dissents. The only relevant thing that has changed since
Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court.
Today's ruling this strikes at the vitals of stare decisis
193
Thus Stevens raises the specter of the primary public policy
behind the stare decisis rule, the destabilizing effect a rapidly
changing composition on the court can have on settled precedent. 194
2. The Facial Challenge to Austin and McConnell
The first aspect of the Court's challenge to the continued
validity of Austin and McConnell is its premise that the BCRA
regulation amounts to an outright ban on corporate independent
expenditures. 95 Stevens attacks this premise on multiple grounds.
First, the dissent believes the PAC mechanism is a sufficient avenue
for corporations and unions to fund their legitimate electioneering
communication. 196  Second, the MCFL exception has created an
192 The majority continually says that Austin "was not well reasoned" and
that the government's lack of reliance on the precedent diminishes "'the principle
of adhering to that precedent."' See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
193 Id. at 941-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 942. "'[T]he means by which we ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion'
that 'permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals."' Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Hillary, 474
U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
'9 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 942-43. While recognizing that PACs are separate organizations,
a major point in the majority's argument that PAC speech could not be equated to
corporate speech, the dissent argues that that was the entire point of creating the
PAC. Id. at 942. It provides corporations an avenue for raising funds and engaging
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additional avenue through which ideologically minded individuals
can pool their efforts through the corporate form.' 97 Third, the
narrow scope of the statute with regard to the type of corporate
communication covered did not prevent or exclude corporations from
entering the general public dialogue in a meaningful way.' 98
Next Stevens challenges the Court's contention that identity-
based distinctions were impermissible under First Amendment
jurisprudence.1 9 9  While recognizing that certain identity-based
distinctions are "frowned on," Stevens notes that the Court upheld
distinctions in a number of contexts including students, prisoners, the
Armed Forces, foreigners, and federal employees. 200
In the context of campaign finance reform, the "legislatures are
entitled to decide 'that the special characteristics of the corporate
structure require particularly careful regulation' in an electoral
context."20 1 In addition, "[c]ampaign finance distinctions based on
corporate identity tend to be less worrisome . . . because the
'speakers' are not natural persons .. . and the governmental interests
are of the highest order." 202
in advocacy, while maintaining a separateness that keeps the PAC from implicating
the corruption concerns. See id. at 942 ("The ability to form and administer
separate segregated funds . . has provided corporations and unions with a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. That has
been this Court's unanimous view." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203).
'19 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing MCFL,
479 U.S. at 263-264).
198 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 943-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Specifically, the dissent notes that the scope was narrowly drawn around a
particular type of media that was identified by Congress to be particularly
troublesome, the thirty and sixty day windows reflected a minimal intrusion into
the time frame of unregulated advocacy, and the exception for true issue advocacy
under WRTL II. Id. at 943-944.
199 Id. at 945-948.
200 Id. at 945 nn. 41-45. The majority did identify the same list of
appropriate identity based restrictions. See, supra note 123. They also tied that
short list to a public function exception to the identity based restriction ban. See
supra note 123.
201 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC
v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 206 (1982)).
202 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
takes its criticism of the majority's identity based regulation ban a step further by
noting that, at its extreme, such a ban would prevent restrictions of the speech of
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3. The Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence
This leads to Stevens's criticism of another pillar of the
majority opinion, namely that Austin and McConnell were "radical
outliers" in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.203 In
examining the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, Stevens
discusses the original understanding of the First Amendment as it
applied to Corporations, the judicial and legislative history of
restrictions based upon the Corporate identity in Campaign Finance
law, and the background and effect of the Court's decisions in
Buckley and Bellotti.204
Stevens first attacks the Court's invocation of "ancient First
Amendment principles." 2 05  The thrust of the dissent's argument is
that, at the time of the First Amendment's passage, "Corporations
were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities,
'designed to serve a social function for the state."' 206 "Even 'the
notion that business corporations could invoke the First Amendment
would probably have been quite a novelty,' given that 'at the time the
legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely on
a concession of the sovereign. "'207
Furthermore, Stevens notes that several of the framers carried
an intense distrust of the corporate form. 208 Viewing the First
foreign and multi-national corporations, or even war time propagandists such as the
infamous "Tokyo Rose" during World War II. Id. at 947-948.
203 Id. at 948.
204 Id. at 948-52.
205 Id. at 948.
206 Id. at 949.
207 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 950 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
541, 578 (1991)). Justice Scalia's concurrence directly attacks Stevens's
interpretation of original First Amendment ideals. While Stevens himself
concedes that "we cannot be certain how a law such as BCRA § 203 meshes with
the original meaning of the First Amendment," he rejects the notion that simply
because corporations are now created by individuals, "it follows . . . that their
electioneering must be equally protected by the First Amendment and equally
immunized from expenditure limits." Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
208 See id. at 949 n. 54.
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Amendment in light of how corporations were created and treated at
the time of the Bill of Rights passage, Stevens concludes, "it seems to
me implausible that the Framers believed 'the freedom of speech'
would extend equally to all corporate speakers, much less that it
would preclude legislatures from taking limited measures to guard
against corporate capture of elections."209
As already noted in the legislative history section of this
article, the general trend of campaign finance reform in the United
States is to restrict the manner and means with which Corporations
could make candidate contributions.2 10 In fact, the second prong of
Stevens's argument against the majority's interpretation of First
Amendment principles to the corporate form hinges on this restrictive
trend.21' Stevens notes that by the time the Court decided Buckley in
1976, "the bar on corporate contributions and expenditures had
become such an accepted part of federal campaign finance regulation
. . . no one even bothered to argue that the bar as such was
unconstitutional." 2 12  As a matter of fact, because of the careful
balance the legislature sought to maintain between allowing a free
flow of information and protecting against the inherent dangers
corporations posed to the election process, the Court traditionally
gave tremendous deference to the incremental regulatory approach
taken in the campaign finance reform arena.2 13
Stevens takes particular ire with the Court's interpretations of
Buckley and Bellotti.2 14  While both cases seemingly struck down
209 Id. at 952. While Stevens makes this argument, he does it only for the
purpose of rebutting the majority's efforts "to cast itself as a guardian of ancient
values." Id. Stevens directly concedes that particularly in the field of campaign
finance jurisprudence the modem Court has not followed the views of the framers
very closely as their "political universe differed profoundly from that of today." Id.
210 Id. at 952-953 (tracing the development of corporate contribution
regulation).
211 Id. at 955.
212 Id.
213 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 955 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("Congress'
.careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance,
step by step, to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of
corporations... warrants considerable deference,' and 'reflects a permissible
assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process.'
(quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (unanimous opinion)).
214 Citizen's United, 130 S. Ct. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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restrictions on corporate spending, Stevens would read them less as
generally overruling corporate restrictions on campaign financing,
but rather as limited exceptions to the general ban on the use of
corporate general treasury funds to finance "electioneering
communication."2 15
First, Stevens sees reliance on Buckley as mistaken because
Buckley was balancing First Amendment protection against "the
ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." 216 As
the dissent aptly points out, relative voice equalization was not an
interest either proffered by the government or evaluated by the
Court.217 This argument is even more compelling since the Austin
court actually evaluated and dismissed the relative voice equalization
interest when it held that the government interest in preventing
potentially distorting effects of large amounts of wealth was strong
enough to uphold the restrictions on corporate spending. 2 18
Second, Stevens finds the majority's position that, whatever
the ambiguities in Buckley, Bellotti "forbade distinctions between
corporate and individual expenditures," to be outright wrong. 2 19
Stevens argues that Bellotti placed "an explicit limitation on the
scope of its holding, that 'our consideration of a corporation's right to
speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right
in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign
for election to public office."' 2 20
215 Id. at 958-60.
216 Id. at 958.
217 Id.
218 Id. (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
219 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 Id. Steven also argues that Bellotti dealt with a very different factual
situation than the one at bar; namely that the regulation at issue was passed
specifically to mute the voice of corporations so the legislature could try to push
through a new state constitutional amendment authorizing a graduated income tax,
an amendment that the people had previously rejected. Id. at 959 (citing Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 768). "Where, as here, the legislature's suppression of speech suggests
an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended."
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769-70. But even the Bellotti court acknowledged that the
outcome may have been different if there was a "record or legislative findings that
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Since Buckley evaluated a different governmental interest than
that proposed in either Austin or McConnell, and Bellotti explicitly
limited its reach to matters of 'general public interest' excluding
issues related to the funding of political campaigns, it is inapposite to
apply the reasoning and conclusions of those cases to that of Austin
and McConnell, and disingenuous to argue that the reasoning of the
four cases cannot be reconciled with each other.22 1
4. The Compelling Government Interests
After dispelling the majority's arguments that Austin and
McConnell sit inapposite to the Court's line of First Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to Campaign Finance Reform, the
dissenters next examined the three compelling state interests
defended in Austin and McConnell that they find equally applicable
here: anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection. 22 2
The dissent's arguments against the majority's interpretation
of the Anticorruption interest are two-fold. First, they believe that
that the majority's limited view of the Government's anticorruption
interest is misguided and irreconcilable with past precedent.223
Second, even using the majority's own limited view of the
government's legitimate concern of quid pro quo corruption, the
evidence on the record satisfies that interest. 22 4
The dissent sees the government's legitimate anticorruption
interest as "encompass[ing] the myriad ways in which outside parties
may induce an officeholder to confer a legislative benefit in direct
response to, or anticipation of, some outlay of money the parties have
made or will make on behalf of the officeholder." 2 25  Citing the
extensive findings made by the district court judge in McConnell,
when the Court heard the first challenge to BCRA section 203, the
dissent notes that not only were there ample examples of actual
corruption, but at least 80% of the population are of the view that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests . ." Id at 789.
221 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 960.
222 Id. at 960-82.
223 Id. at 960.
224 Id. at 964-67.
225 Id at 964.
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"[c]orporations and other organizations that engage in electioneering
communications, which benefit specific elected officials, received
special consideration from those officials when matters arise that
affect these corporations and organizations."22 6
In framing the scope of these myriad interests, the Court
"recognized Congress' legitimate interest in preventing the money
that is spent on elections from exerting an 'undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment."' 227 While bribery, or other such obvious
examples of quid pro quo corruption, may be the prototypical
examples, the record developed by Congress eschews the creation or
maintenance of any such bright line definition for corruption as it
pertains to corporate spending on political campaigns. 22 8
While the majority argues that, despite this lack of a bright
line, Buckley clearly states that the anticorruption interest is
inadequate to justify a regulation of independent expenditures, the
dissent distinguishes Buckley's holding on the ground that the FECA
regulation struck down in Buckley applied to all independent
expenditures not corporate expenditures specifically. 2 29  Also,
Buckley "expressly contemplated that an anticorruption rationale
might justify restrictions on independent expenditures at a later
date," 2 30 because corporate independent expenditures may "pose the
same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do
large contributions."231
In addition, the majority recognizes that the anti-corruption
interest is not limited to actual quid pro quo corruption but to the
appearance of that same corruption.2 32 The dissent notes that in just
the previous term the same Court, in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
226 Id. at 962 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d. at 555-560).
227 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152)
228 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229 See supra, note 21.
230 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 964-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 965 (quoting WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 478).
232 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 964 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the
majority accepts that there is a legitimate interest in preventing the appearance of
corruption, they argue that the interest is very narrow, refusing to see "ingratiation
and access" as evidence of corruption. Id. at 909-10.
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Co.,233 found independent expenditures made during the campaign of
a West Virginia high court judge to present such a worry of the
appearance of corruption to require the forced recusal of the judge
from hearing a case involving a party who made over three million
dollars in independent expenditures in support of his election
campaign.23 Under the Court's analysis in Caperton, the dissent
easily finds a legitimate government concern regarding the
appearance of corruption presented by large independent
expenditures. 23 5
Turning to the Antidistortion Interest, the dissent emphasizes
that the monies in corporate treasuries do not represent in any way
individual support for their political ideas.236 Instead, they reflect the
economic decisions of investors and customers. 2 37 Also, the dissent
notes that "[c]orporate speech . . . is derivative speech, speech by
proxy." 238  A regulation of that speech only "affect[s] the way in
which individuals disseminate certain messages . . . but it does not
prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice." 2 39 Because
of these facts, Austin and McConnell recognized that the large masses
of wealth aggregated by corporations could "distort public debate in
ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of listeners."240
As a final note, the dissent discusses the Shareholder
Protection Interest. 24 1  By allowing corporations to use general
treasury funds, the Court allows corporate management to hand the
bill for the corporation's political agenda to its shareholders. 2 42 The
233 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
234 Id. at 2263 (noting "[t]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias").
235 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
236 Id. at 971.
237 Id. As such, the "corporation must engage the electoral process with the
aim 'to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the
arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities . "' Id. at 974 (quoting
Brief for American Independent Business Alliance as Amicus Curiae 11).
238 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 972.
240 Id. at 974.
241 Id at 977.
242 Id at 977. While the majority argues that corporate governance is
sufficient to protect this interest. Id. at 911. Minority shareholders do not have a
cause of action against management or the directors if the spending supported a
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dissent proposes that the use of PACs, disdained by the majority,
fulfills the ultimate purpose of allowing ideologically like-minded
shareholders to pool their resources for political spending without
implicating the resources of all.2 43
D. Concurring Opinions
The concurrences by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia
directly address some of the challenges made by Justice Stevens's
dissent. Chief Justice Roberts writes to refute Justice Stevens's
contention that the majority has engaged in judicial activism with its
abandonment of stare decisis.244 Justice Scalia's opinion addresses
Justice Stevens's contention that, under "ancient First Amendment
principles," corporations did not have the free speech rights that the
majority gives them in Citizens United.2 4 5
Chief Justice Roberts contends that Austin should be overruled
for four primary reasons: the decision departed from the robust
protection afforded political speech in Buckley and Bellotti, Austin
has been continually criticized by the members of the Court, Austin
rationale threatens speech outside the political sphere, and because
the Government was not spirited in its defense of the precedent. 246
Most of Chief Justice Roberts's contentions merely rehash issues
already raised by Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. As such, the
fundamental difference between their views lies not in their
adherence to stare decisis principles, but in their disagreement over
whether Austin was decided incorrectly. 24 7
Scalia argues that the Founders' distrust of corporations had
less to do with the corporate form and more to do with the "state-
granted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations
legitimate economic goal of the company, despite the fact that it may be counter to
an ideological goal of the individual shareholder. See id. at 978.
243 Id. at 977.
244 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
245 Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 921-24.
247 See id. at 920 ("[w]hen considering whether to reexamine a prior
erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having constitutional
questions decided against the importance of having them decided right.")
(emphasis in original).
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enjoyed." 24 8  He further contends that the "true progenitors" of
corporations - the small associations, colleges, towns, religious
institutions and guilds - all "actively petitioned the Government and
expressed their views in newspapers and pamphlets." 2 49 Because the
Government viewed them as having robust free speech rights, it is
only logical that modern corporations have the same rights. 250
IV. THE FUTURE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
To say that the Court's decision in Citizens United caused
tremendous upheaval in the realm of campaign finance reform is to
understate the significance of the opinion. Since its publication in
January of 2010, Citizens United has created an academic fury as
liberals and conservatives seek to defend the opinions of their
respective factions.251 In examining the manner in which Citizens
United will affect the future of campaign finance reform, this article
will look at how the case fits into a vision of First Amendment free
speech rights, the likely legislative reaction to the opinion, and the
judicial interpretation of the decision's scope.
This split along ideological lines can also be characterized as
the expression of two distinct views of First Amendment speech
protection. 2 52  The first view, as expressed by Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion, "sees free speech as serving the interest of political
liberty. "253 The second view, as expressed by Justice Stevens's
dissent, sees "free speech [rights] as serv[ing] the interest of political
248 1d. at 926.
249 Id. at 927.
250 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 927.
251 See Is the Supreme Court's Citizens United Decision Hurting
Democracy?, USNEWS.COM POLITICAL OPINION (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/09/24/Is-the-Supreme-Courts-
Citizens-United-Hurting-Democracy (providing parallel discussions of the pro and
con views of Citizens United).
252 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010).
253 Id. at 144. Under this view, speech as liberty, the primary purpose of
the First Amendment is the "checking of government overreaching into the private
order." Id. at 155.
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equality." 254 While there is a tremendous overlap between these two
visions of speech rights, where they conflict the Court will likely be
split in the same way as it was in Citizens United.
The legislative response has been acute as a panoply of bills
was proposed to strengthen the disclosure and disclaimer provisions
that the Court left intact.25 5 President Obama even felt it necessary to
condemn the Court's opinion in his State of the Union Address:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I
believe will open the floodgates for special interests -
including foreign corporations - to spend without limit
in our elections. I don't think American elections should
be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or
worse, by foreign entities. 2 56
While the immediate effect of the opinion is quite clear,
legislatures, both federal and state, can no longer prohibit the use of
corporate general treasury funds for independent expenditures.
254 Id. Under this view, the proper speech to place the most protection on
is that of dissidents and dissenters, the minority of speakers whose voices might
otherwise be drowned out. Id. at 150. In a manner similar to equal protection laws
it would strike down laws that discriminate against the minority or "exact
orthodoxy from speech interests that are subordinate or disadvantaged in the
private order." Id. at 155.
255 See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Shareholder
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010); Prevent Foreign Influence
in our Elections Act, H.R. 4540, 111th Cong. (2010); Corporate and Labor
Electioneering Advertisement Reform Act, H.R. 4527, 11Ith Cong. (2010); Save
Our Democracy from Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H.R. 4523, 111th Cong.
(2010); Prohibiting Foreign Influence in American Elections Act, H.R. 4522, 111th
Cong. (2010); Freedom from Foreign-Based Manipulation in American Elections
Act of 2010, H.R. 4517, 111 th Cong. (2010); Pick Your Poison Act of 2010, H.R.
4511, 111th Cong. (2010); End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R.
4487, 111th Cong. (2010).
256 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 27, 2010, 9:11PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
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There is significant uncertainty as to what the future holds for
campaign finance reform.
There are some indications that Citizens United may be just the
tip of the deregulation iceberg, with the new conservative majority
dictating the future lines of permissible regulation. 25 7  Kennedy's
influence in Citizens United, as the drafter of the opinion, is
pronounced, but it was the steady work of previous and current
members pointed dissents that espoused this narrower view of the
governmental anticorruption interest - a view adopted by the Court in
Citizens United.258
The primary legislative response to Citizens United is the
Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act). 259 The DISCLOSE Act would ban
independent expenditures by foreign corporations and government
contractors and tighten the disclosure requirements for the
electioneering communication now allowed under Citizens United.260
Specifically, the DISCLOSE Act seeks to expand the
timeframe for qualifying speech under electioneering communication
from sixty days to one hundred and twenty days. 2 6 1 It also increases
the number and detail required from disclosure reports. 2 62
257 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam: Corporate Money
and Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 91, 146 (2009).
Up until now, the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
to the Supreme Court has led to what, at least on their face, were only
marginal changes in the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence.
The explicit request by the Court for the parties in this case to
address the continued viability of two precedents, when the Court
could easily have disposed of the case on relatively narrow grounds,
appears to signal a more radical shift, especially when combined with
statements of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in earlier
campaign finance cases. Id. at 146.
258 See David Axelman, Citizens United: How the New Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence has Been Shaped by Previous Dissents, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 293,
294 (2010).
259 H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
260 DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§101-102, 201-203 (2010).
261 Id. at § 202.
2621 d at §203.
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This focus on strengthening disclosure requirements has
received strong criticism.2 63 There is also precedent for the protection
for anonymous speech, especially in the political speech realm.2 64
As for the potential judicial response, the two changes that
cause the most concern and speculation are: (1) the narrow view of
the government's legitimate anticorruption interest, and (2) the
blanket view that identity-based restrictions are impermissible under
the First Amendment.
For decades the Rehnquist Court expanded the permissible
scope of the governmental anticorruption interest; from quid pro quo
corruption and the appearance thereof to the antidistortion interest
introduced in Austin. The replacement of Rehnquist and O'Conner
with Roberts and Alito created a new majority that had a narrower
view of corruption. While exactly how far the Court takes this new
interpretation of corruption will depend on the factual scenarios that
come before it, early ramifications of this narrow interpretation of the
anticorruption interest have already been felt.26 5
In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,2 66 the
D.C. Circuit interpreted the limited scope of the government's anti-
corruption interest, as defined in Citizens United, to not apply to non-
corporations that only raised money for the purpose of independent
263 See Bopp, James and Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of "Reform and
Transperency": A Plea to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens
United's "Disclaimer and Disclosure" Holding, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL'Y
3 (2011). The authors argue that potential for backlash against those speaking in the
political arena militates in favor of more First Amendment protection and less
stringent disclosure requirements. Specifically they cite the example of Prop 8
fundraising in California where the disclosure of the names of those who funded
the Yes on Prop 8 Campaign were disclosed and resulted in angry phone calls and
other harassment. Id. at 22. See also supra note 162. Justice Thomas echoes these
same arguments.
264 See Daryll R. Wold, Tell Us Who You Are- Maybe: Speaker Disclaimers
After Citizens United, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL'Y 171 (2011). The author
questions the continued validity of Court precedent which found First Amendment
protection for anonymous speech in the political arena such as Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334
(1994).
265 See Mayer, supra note 257.
266 SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm'n., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
Fall 2011 Citizens United 599
600 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
expenditures.26 7 SpeechNow was a nonprofit association that
intended to engage in advocacy for candidates that supported its
views of free speech and assembly rights.2 68 The SpeechNow.org
court reasoned that such organizations are incapable of implicating
the government's only permissible regulatory purpose: preventing
both the appearance of and actual quid pro quo corruption.2 69
SpeechNow.org may overshadow the future of campaign
finance, with the trend already set for individuals and corporations to
incorporate and use the structure of a 501(c)(4) organization to
distribute their funds instead of a PAC.270 While 501 (c)(4)
organizations and their ilk are subject to disclosure requirements,
they are not nearly as onerous as the dollar in-dollar out reporting
that is required for PACs. 27 1
So far the judicial response to Citizens United is more acute at
the local level rather than the national. Numerous state and local
campaign finance laws are now under attack as violative of free
speech rights. 27 2 There is currently no available statistical evidence
267 Id. at 694. The D.C. Circuit actually went further and interpreted
Citizens United as saying that in no circumstances does the government ever have a
legitimate anti-corruption interest to regulate independent expenditures, and the
anti-corruption interest is the only governmental interest sufficient for a
contribution or expenditure limitation. Id.
268 Id. at 688.
269 Id. at 694-695. "In light of the Court's holding as a matter of law that
independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption." Id. (italics in original).
This statement is reminiscent of Stevens's prediction in his dissent that if the
majority followed its logic all the way through, it would not allow government
regulations of independent expenditures in any context, including where foreign
nationals and corporations seek to influence our elections.
270 See Micheal Kanga, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REv. 243, 252
(2010).
271 See 2 U.S.C. § 431.
272 Thalheimer v. San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding anti-
corruption interest did not support San Diego's contribution limitation on
independent expenditures); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. Long
Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that independent contribution
limitations to PAC's violated the First Amendment). For a summary of state
legislative and judicial responses to Citizens United, see http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid= 19607 (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
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as to whether this will result in more dollars spent in local election
campaigns or how the increasing use of disclosure requirements as a
means of regulation will potentially limit the ability for fundraising
for contentious social issues.273
Overall, this ideological split among the members of the Court
brings a lack of cohesion and utter incoherence to the campaign
finance regulation.274 Richard Hasen, in his article Citizens United
and the Illusion of Coherence, argued that for the Court's majority to
stick to their guns and truly apply their statement that the identity of
the speaker has no relevance to the government's interests they
would be forced to allow unlimited foreign expenditures.2 75
Despite many of the bold predictions regarding the effects
Citizens United will have on election spending and the costs of
campaigns in general, the fact is that prior to the decision, it was
expected that the presidential nominees for 2012 would each have to
raise one billion dollars to mount an effective campaign. During the
2008 election cycle, moneyed interests dominated and controlled the
access and range of issues presented to the voting public. Despite
repeated attempts at better and more effective regulation, the money
spent on general elections, specifically by corporations and unions,
increases every year. Perhaps a better disclosure system is not only
the right move, but the only move to potentially curb the abuses that
can and do occur with money in elections.
273 See supra note 273. See also supra note 264. While the article contends
that disclosure requirements will limit fundraising for social issues, it provides
examples of harassment but no hard statistics as to the limiting effect it will
actually have on fundraising dollars.
274 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence,
109 MIcH. L. REv. 581 (2011). In Hasen's article, he argues that Citizens United
did nothing to remove the internal incoherence of Campaign Finance jurisprudence,
and has simply raised the specter of some difficult potentially contradictory
opinions in the future with respect to foreign contributions and even previously
settled issues such as direct expenditures. SeeDISCLOSE Act, supra note 202.
275 Hasen, supra, note 275 at 605. The DISCLOSE Act would potentially
close this loophole in regulation, but it remains to be seen whether it will pass, and
whether the current Court would allow its ban on foreign independent expenditures,
especially in light of the interpretation taken by the D.C. Circuit court in
SpeechNow.org. See supra note 267.
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